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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
DOUGLAS J. TUELLER, : Case No. 930799-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State's failure to disclose through discovery 
evidence that the state intended to produce including a recorded 
statement taken from Matthew Despain by State investigator Ron 
Miller reports thereto, requires that Mr. Tueller be granted a 
new trial. 
Standard of Review: "An error based on nondisclosure 
by the prosecution warrants reversal "'"only if a 
review of the record persuades the court that without 
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant."'" State v. 
Archuleta 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah 1993)(quoting 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)(emphasis 
in original)(quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 
1048 (Utah 1984)(quoting State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 
635, 637 (Utah 1982))). 
2. Whether the State's knowing elicitation of false 
testimony by Ron Miller (that there was no recording of his 
conversation with Matthew Despain and that no notes were taken) 
requires that Mr. Tueller be granted a new trial. 
Standard of Review: Any conviction obtained by the 
knowing use of false testimony must be reversed "if 
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury." Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules are contained in 
Addendum A. 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV 
Utah Const. Art 1, § 7 
Rules 
Rule 16(a), Utah R.Crim.P. (1993) 
Rule 16(g), Utah R.Crim.P. (1993) 
Rule 30, Utah R.Crim.P. (1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of Theft 
from a Person, a felony of the second degree, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 and § 76-6-412 (1953 as amended) in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding. Following a two and a 
half day trial on April 12-14, 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Tueller 
as charged in the amended information. 
On May 21, 1993, Mr. Tueller was sentenced to a term of one 
to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison which was stayed. A 
motion for a new trial was filed May 27, 1993. The original 
notice of appeal was filed June 14, 1993. An order denying the 
motion for a new trial was rendered by the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat on November 30, 1993. An amended notice of appeal was 
filed December 6, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Douglas Tueller, as a former employee of the Salt Palace, 
had some knowledge of the procedures for acquiring event tickets. 
(R. 170 at 169 He had purchased tickets on several occasions 
prior to the date in question, June 6, 1992, for friends and 
family members (R. 170 at 155). 
Tueller's friend, Bob Miller, requested that he purchase 
Garth Brooks concert tickets for him (R. 170 at 154). Tueller 
felt there was a chance those tickets could be acquired on the 
day of the concert (R. 170 at 155). He knew that there were 
procedures wherein tickets were released at a certain time (R. 
170 at 158). Tueller made calls to the ticket booth and then 
appeared personally (R. 170 at 156-159). He was unable to 
acquire tickets as they had sold all of the tickets released at 
that time (R. 170 at 160). He went back to his car, where his 
friend and fellow teammate, Matthew Despain, was waiting (R. 170 
at 161). Both were on a softball team and had a scheduled game 
that evening (R. 170 at 121, 161). Prior to arriving at the 
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Delta Center, Despain had lent money to Tueller to purchase the 
tickets: the amount and denomination of which is in question (R. 
170 at 137-38, 170, 215, 216, 221, 278, 287) . 
After Tueller got into his vehicle, he proceeded south on 
300 West (R. 170 at 161). Quite near the corner of 300 West and 
100 South, Tueller spotted a woman who appeared to be holding 
out tickets for sale (R. 170 at 164-165). He parked just past 
the crosswalk and walked over to the woman, Krista Warberg, and 
asked the price of the tickets (R. 170 at 165). Tueller asserts 
that her reply was that they were fifty dollars ($50.00) (R. 170 
at 167, 185-86). 
Despain testified that he looked over and saw Tueller 
holding tickets and Warberg holding money (R. 170 at 126, 140). 
Tueller attests that once he had exchanged a fifty dollar bill 
for the tickets, Warberg claimed fifty dollars each, at which 
point he declined to tender over more money and left (R. 170 at 
167-68, 185-86) . Warberg claimed that Tueller never tendered any 
money but instead took the tickets out of her hand and left (R. 
170 at 76). 
Tueller was charged with Theft from a Person, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 and § 
76-6-412 (1953 as amended) by amended information on August 28, 
1992 (R. 6-7). 
On September 3, 1992, counsel for the defendant, filed and 
served upon the Salt Lake County Attorneys Office a formal 
request for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure (R. 22-23), see Addendum B. 
On or about October 17, 1992, but prior to the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor in this case, and Ron Miller, a state 
criminal investigator, interviewed Despain, a defense witness, at 
his home in the presence of Despain7s wife, Ann Despain (R. 170 
at 128-29, 202, 204, 213). The prosecutor characterized the 
interview as a "pre-trial interview or a pre-hearing interview" 
(R. 170 at 202). Miller took a tape recorder with him to the 
interview (R. 148 and 170 at 219, 222), as well as a pad of paper 
(R. 170 at 216). Despain testified at trial that Miller tape-
recorded the interview (R. 170 at 130). Despain has sworn in an 
affidavit that Miller and the prosecutor tape-recorded the twenty 
minute interview (R. 132-33), see Addendum C. Ann Despain has 
also sworn in an affidavit that Miller and the prosecutor tape-
recorded the twenty minute interview (R. 134-35), see Addendum C. 
Miller testified at trial that at the interview with Despain, he 
"jotted," and "doodled" on his pad of paper (R. 170 at 216). When 
testifying to the denomination of bills lent to Tueller by 
Despain, Miller stated, "I believe it's been written down, it has 
been written down by me" (R. 170 at 222, lines 5-6). Miller also 
testified at trial upon direct examination by the prosecutor that 
he took no notes of the interview and took no recording of the 
interview (R. 170 at 213). 
A preliminary hearing was held October 22, 1992 (R. 19) . 
The prosecutor did not call Despain as a witness (R. 19, 170 at 
202) . 
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The prosecutor had knowledge that Despain was to be a 
witness for the defense (R. 170 at 203, lines 21-23). Defense 
counsel's discovery request formally requested, among other 
items, all investigations concerning the case, all physical 
evidence taken, all evidence tending to negate guilt of the 
Defendant, and all evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment (R. 22), see Addendum B. The 
prosecutor did not disclose the audio tape and notes made 
contemporaneous with or as a result of the interview with Despain 
(R. 170 at 196). Prior to trial, defense counsel never received 
discovery information as to whether Despain would be a witness 
for the State or as to what he may or may not testify to (R. 170 
at 197). Defense counsel did not receive notice that the 
interview with Despain was recorded or that Miller would testify 
regarding that interview, or to any other matters, until April 
12, 1993, the first day of trial (R. 170 at 130,198). 
Prior to breaking for lunch on the second day of trial, 
April 13, 1993, defense counsel objected on the record to the 
State's failure to disclose both the tape recording and the notes 
taken by the prosecution and its investigator in the October 17, 
1992 interview with Despain (R. 170 at 196-202). Defense 
objected also to the State's failure to disclose Miller as a 
witness until the first day of trial (R. 170 at 197-198). The 
trial judge ruled that Rule 16 does not require disclosure of the 
tape-recording, notes, or that Miller was to be a witness, and 
denied the defense's motions for a mistrial and exclusion of the 
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testimonial evidence of Miller (R. 170 at 204) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to disclose through discovery a tape 
recording made of the interview with defense witness Matthew 
Despain as well as the handwritten notes of Ron Miller taken at 
or as a result of this interview in violation of Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
When the State's discovery violation was brought to the 
attention of the trial court, the trial judge committed 
reversible error by denying defense counsel's requested relief: 
a motion for a mistrial and a motion for exclusion of Miller's 
testimony stemming from the October 17, 1992 interview. 
The State's discovery violation and the trial court's denial 
of defense counsel's motions for relief constitute an abuse of 
discretion warranting reversal. These errors substantially 
impaired the defendant's ability to defend himself at trial and 
this prejudice was not mitigated by the trial court. 
The prosection violated defendant's rights to a fair trial 
by knowingly eliciting false testimony from Miller. This false 
testimony created a false impression and affected the judgment of 
the jury. Even though the prosecutor was aware of the false 
character of Miller's testimony, he did nothing to correct the 
false impression in the minds of the jury. The use of false 
testimony aided the State in obtaining a tainted conviction. The 
conviction must thus be vacated, and this case remanded for a new 
trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THROUGH DISCOVERY 
EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE INTENDED TO PRODUCE REGARDING 
STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM MATTHEW DESPAIN BY STATE 
INVESTIGATOR RON MILLER, INCLUDING RECORDED STATEMENTS 
AND REPORTS AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT 
AND REQUIRES THAT MR. TUELLER BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. 
A. The State tape-recorded and took notes of a pre-trial 
interview with a defense witness and did not disclose these 
items to the defense through discovery. 
Both the testimony and the affidavit of Matthew Despain assert 
that State investigator Ron Miller tape recorded the interview he 
conducted along with the prosecutor on or about October 17, 1992 
(hereinafter "October 17") (R. 132-33, 170 at 130) . Ann Despain has 
also sworn in an affidavit Miller asked to tape record the 
interview and then did so (R. 134-35) . Miller has signed an 
affidavit maintaining that he took no notes of the interview and 
the interview was not tape recorded (R. 151-52). 
The testimony and affidavit of Despain demonstrate that Miller 
recorded the October 17 interview. Ann Despain's affidavit 
collaborates Despain's, evidencing its truthfulness. 
Matthew Despain was the only eyewitness to the events of the 
case apart from Krista Warberg, her friend, and the defendant 
himself. Upon direct examination by defense counsel at trial, 
Despain mentioned the recording of the interview only in passing, 
not in response to a specific question. This was the time at which 
defense counsel first learned of the existence of the tape 
recording. The questioning at trial was as follows: 
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Q (By Mr. Valdez) Well, he--that was your conversation? 
A Yeah, that's what I was saying, I was saying it to both of 
them. 
Q --were telling them you didn't want to come? 
A They're both--
Q Okay. And--
A --asking me questions and recording it and I'm not sure 
exactly which one asked me which question, but you know (R. 170 
at 130) . 
Miller's testimony at trial demonstrates the likelihood that 
he recorded the October 17 interview and that he took notes at, 
or as a result of that interview. 
In addition to Despain's testimony at trial stating that 
Miller recorded the interview, Miller testified that he took a 
tape recorder to the interview (R. 170 at 130, 219, 221, 222). 
Miller testified further that when he goes to an interview, he 
usually takes a recorder as a matter of course (R. 170 at 221). 
Further, Miller acknowledged on cross examination that it is 
generally good practice to record an interview depending upon 
"whether the person's a witness, a suspect or simply a-- an 
important witness or a periphery witness," (R. 170 at 219). 
Miller's testimony, especially in light of Despain's revelation, 
weakens if not destroys the State's assertion that the interview 
was not recorded. That an investigator with 27 years of law 
enforcement experience (R. 170 at 212) would bring a tape 
recorder to an interview of a defense witness in preparation for 
9 
trial and then forget to record the interview is doubtful. 
Miller also testified that he took a pad of paper with him 
to the interview on which he "jotted" and "doodled," (R. 170 at 
216). When defense counsel asked Miller whether he had written 
down the information given by Matthew Despain regarding the 
amount and denomination of his loan to Tueller, the testimony was 
as follows: 
Q Let me ask you this: Did--did you specifically jot down in 
your diary or any notes that you have in your possession, tens 
and twenties? 
A No, sir, I did not. 
Q So you're testifying from memory in that regard then; is 
that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q As far as you know, that's not written down, anywhere? 
A I believe it's written down, it has been written down by me. 
(R. 170 at 221-22). 
Miller's testimony demonstrates that he wrote down the 
information obtained in the interview. The State did not 
disclose this information to the defense. 
B. The State's failure to disclose the recording and notes of 
the October 17 interview with Despain and that Miller would 
be a rebuttal witness constituted a violation of the State's 
discovery duties. 
Rule 16(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) 
imposes a prosecutorial duty to provide discovery material to the 
defense upon request. The Supreme Court of Utah has explained 
that "considerations of fairness require that the prosecution 
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respond to the request in a manner that will not be misleading." 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). The Knight court 
articulated two requirements that the prosecution must meet upon 
responding to a defense request for discovery. The Court 
required first that "the prosecution either must produce all of 
the material requested or must identify explicitly those portions 
of the request with respect to which no responsive material will 
be provided." Id. at 916-17. The Court required second that once 
the prosecution agrees to produce the requested material, "it 
must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis to 
the defense." Id. at 917; see also State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1242-43 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 
582, 585 (Utah App. 1993). 
"The starting place for analyzing the propriety of the 
prosecutor's conduct is defendant's motion to discover." Knight, 
734 P.2d at 916. In his September 3, 1992 Formal Request for 
Discovery defense counsel specifically requested, among other 
items, "All . . . investigations concerning the above-entitled 
case; The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal 
record including any convictions of any witness to be called by 
the prosecution; All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and all investigative analysis 
done on any evidence in the above-entitled case." (R. 22-23), see 
Addendum B. 
Despite this request, defense counsel learned for the first 
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time on the first day of trial that the State had interviewed 
Despain, that Miller had recorded that interview, and that Miller 
would testify (R. 170 at 128-30, 198). On the second day of 
trial, defense counsel learned for the first time that Miller had 
taken notes at or resulting from the interview (R. 170 at 216, 
222) . 
The State responded to defense counsel's request by 
disclosing, among other things, a list of witnesses, see Addendum 
D. Upon its voluntarily response to defense counsel's discovery 
request, the State subjected itself to the two requirements 
articulated by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Knight. The 
State, however, failed to meet both of these requirements. 
First, in failing to explicitly identify the tape recording and 
notes of Miller's interview with Despain and that Miller would be 
called as a rebuttal witness as items which were not to be 
responsive to the defense's discovery request, the State failed 
to notify defense counsel of the limited nature of its response 
to the request for production. Second, regarding the same items, 
the State failed to provide defense counsel with after-acquired 
information responsive to the request. 
State v. Barnhart determines the State's duty to notify the 
defense of its rubuttal witnesses, 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Barnhart, the State failed to disclose to defense counsel 
before trial one of a rebuttal witness used to rebut the 
defendant's testimony. At trial, defense counsel moved to have 
the testimony of the rebuttal witness excluded because of the 
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State's discovery violation. Finding that the State should not 
have anticipated the need for the rebuttal witness since it was 
unclear whether the defendant would testify, the Court held that 
"the State was not precluded from calling a rebuttal witness not 
disclosed before trial in circumstances where it, in good faith, 
had no reason to expect the need for such witness at trial," 850 
P.2d at 473. 
Like the State in Barnhart, the-State in the present case 
did not include Miller as a rebuttal witness on its witness list 
given to defense prior to trial, see Addendum D. At trial, the 
prosecutor stated, "I will state that Ron Miller is not on our 
witness list, and the reason why he's not on our witness list is, 
I did not intend on calling him to testify unless Matt Despain 
was called by the defense," (R. 170 at 203). The State knew that 
Despain was to be a defense witness; at trial the prosecutor 
stated that "there was a handwritten list that was handed to [co-
counsel] some time back that indicated that Matt Despain was a 
witness on their list," (R. 170 at 203). Further, even if the 
prosecutor had somehow overlooked the list handed to his co-
counsel, he could have reasonably anticipated that Despain, as 
the only eyewitness to the events of the alleged crime other than 
the two women owning the tickets and the defendant, would have 
been called to testify. 
C. The State's discovery violation and the trial court's denial 
of defense counsel's requested relief along with its failure 
to order any remedial measures under Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16(g) constituted an abuse of discretin requiring 
reversal. 
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Having determined that the state violated its duties of 
discovery required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) and 
the Supreme Court of Utah's mandates in State v. Knight, this 
court should next find that the trial court committed reversible 
error. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) provides: 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it 
is brought to the attention of the court that a party 
has failed to comply with this rule, the court may 
order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may entersuch 
other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Under Rule 16(g), the trial court "has ample power to 
obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal 
discovery rules," State v. Archuleta 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah 
1993) quoting State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987). 
Denial of the relief requested under the rule may constitute an 
abuse of discretion warranting reversal. 734 P.2d at 918. 
"An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any 
remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to 
the defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error 
set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures requested but 
refused would have obviated this prejudice." Id. Rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) provides: " Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has determined that the 
substantial rights of a defendant are affected warranting 
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reversal M/"only when a review of the record persuades the court 
that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for defendant."'" Archuleta 850 P.2d at 
1243, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048, (Utah 1984) 
(quoting State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d, 635, 637 (Utah 1982))). 
The court further defined "reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result" as error which is sufficient to erode or 
undermine the confidence of the reviewing court in the outcome of 
the trial so that a new trial is required. Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 
1243, Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. Finally, "when the State violates 
its duty to disclose information, it bears the burden on appeal 
of persuading the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice 
the defendant." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1243, Knight, 734 P.2d at 
921. 
Upon learning of the State's nondisclosures, defense counsel 
objected to the court on the record (R. 170 at 196-202). Defense 
counsel requested a mistrial or in the alternative to exclude the 
testimony of Miller as it pertained to the interview. 
The trial judge denied the motions ruling that Rule 16 does 
not require the State to disclose the tape recording, notes, or 
that Mr. Miller was to be a witness at trial (R. 170 at 204). 
Miller was allowed to testify, and the trial court did not order 
the State to produce the undisclosed information, nor was defense 
counsel given any additional time to meet the unanticipated 
testimony. Tueller's defense was impaired. The State's 
15 
discovery violations misled the defense into believing that no 
evidence from the October 17 interview existed and thus built 
Tueller's defense around that mistaken belief. Disclosure would 
have allowed the defense to pursue many different avenues in the 
preparation of Tueller's defense: the defense would have devised 
additional or different trial strategies and it is unknown as to 
what additional impeachment evidence the defense would have 
submitted to the jury had the defense seen or heard the State's 
interview with Despain. Further, the defense would have 
instigated its own independent investigation regarding the 
details of the interview and Miller's participation in the case. 
Recent caselaw sheds light on these issues. 
In State v. Knight, the State took statements from two 
State's witnesses but failed to disclose both that the statements 
had been taken and the statements themselves. Defense counsel 
learned of these statements on the first day of trial and asked 
for the testimony of the two witnesses to be excluded, requested 
a continuance, moved for a mistrial, and attempted to withdraw as 
counsel. All defense motions were denied and the witnesses were 
allowed to testify. The Court found that defendant's defense was 
impaired and the State's arguments that the discovery errors were 
not prejudicial were unpersuasive. 
Here, as in Knight, the State's nondisclosure of discovery 
evidence impaired the defendant's defense. Defense counsel was 
caught completely by surprise on the first day of trial by the 
revelations that Miller had tape recorded and taken notes of his 
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interview with one of the two defense witnesses; that the State 
had failed to disclose these items of evidence or even notify the 
defense of these items' existence; and that now Miller was going 
to testify to the interview. Defense counsel was in no way 
prepared to meet Miller's unanticipated testimony. Without an 
opportunity to review the recording and notes, and without 
additional time to prepare for his cross examination of Miller, 
defense counsel's only hope of undermining Miller's credibility 
was to vigorously cross examine Miller. 
On this issue, the Knight court found that vigorous cross 
examination does not obviate prejudice suffered by defendant as a 
result of the State's discovery violation. 734 P.2d at 922. In 
rejecting the State's argument that the defense was not 
prejudiced since defense counsel was prepared to meet the 
testimony, the court stated, " [t]he fact that defense counsel 
conducted vigorous cross examination is not proof that she was 
fully prepared to meet the Moore's testimony." Id. 
The State in Knight argued also that even if the testimony 
was a surprise, other substantial evidence tied defendant to the 
crime. The Court rejected this argument as well, stating that 
"the Moore's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case." 
734 P.2d at 922. In the case at bar, Miller's testimony, 
admitted despite the State's discovery violation, was crucial to 
the prosecution's case; just as Matthew Despain's testimony was 
crucial to Douglas Tueller's defense. 
Matthew Despain was the only eyewitness to the events of the 
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crime apart from the two victims and the defendant himself. He 
was also the only defense witness other than the defendant. As 
such, Despain's credibility was critical to Tueller's defense. 
The State called Miller to the stand as a rebuttal witness. 
His testimony consisted solely of the content of his interview 
with Despain on October 17 (R. 170 at 212-16). As such, Miller's 
testimony was crucial in destroying Despain's credibility. 
Had defense counsel had the opportunity to review the 
undisclosed evidence and/or prepare for Miller's testimony, it is 
entirely likely that the verdict for defendant would have been a 
more favorable one. While one cannot second guess the jury, one 
may speculate as to what reasonably might have been. It is 
reasonable to believe that the defense's adequate preparation for 
Miller's testimony might have formed doubt in the jurors' minds 
as to the degree of Tueller's guilt, thus making it entirely 
possible that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty of 
the lesser included offense of theft instead of the second degree 
felony of theft from a person. 
Miller's testimony impeached both Despain and the defendant 
as to the amount and denomination of the money Despain lent to 
Tueller on the evening of the incident (R. 170 at 215) . The 
prosecution focused intensely on this issue. At trial, the 
prosecutor cross-examined Despain as follows (R. 170 at 137-38) : 
Q Now, you--on the way there, let's back up a little bit, you 
gave money to the defendant, didn't you? 
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A That's correct. 
Q And that was some tens and twenties, or twenties and tens? 
A I don't remember the denomination. 
Q It wasn't a $50 bill, was it? 
A I don't remember the denomination. Could have been. 
Q Do you recall telling Ron Miller that you were certain it 
wasn't a $50 bill? 
A No, I don't recall telling him that. I recall telling him I 
didn't remember what the denominations were. 
Upon cross examination of the defendant, the prosecutor 
asked the following (R. 170 at 178) : 
Q And on the way there, you say Matt Despain gave you a $50 
bill and a $10 bill? 
A That's correct. 
Q And in fact, you asked him to--to lend it to you so you 
could buy the tickets? 
A That's correct. 
Upon direct examination of Ron Miller by the prosecution, 
the following took place (R. 170 at 215): 
A . . . enroute there, Mr. Tueller asked him to borrow--if 
Mr. Despain would lend Mr. Tueller $50. Mr. Tueller--or Mr. 
Despain said he would, and loaned him $50. 
Q What questions, if any, did you ask him about this $50 loan 
that he made to Mr. Tueller, to the defendant? 
A I asked him the denomination of the bills and I asked him 
what he did with the money after he gave it to him. 
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Q Did he tell you what the denominations of the bills were 
that he gave the defendant? 
A Yes, sir. He did. 
Q And what was that? 
A He indicated that he couldn't remember the exact 
denominations, but it was tens and twenties, amounted to $50. 
Q All right. Did you question him as to whether or not he 
could have given him any other amount of money? Any other amount 
of denomination? 
MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, that's leading. I'm 
going to object. 
THE COURT: I'll allow it. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Well, I asked him if it was other--
another denomination, obviously, if it was a $50 bill. And he 
had indicated it was tens and twenties. He didn't know what 
combination of tens and twenties, just tens and twenties. 
Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor used 
Miller's testimony to impeach the defendant, stating, "And even 
Mr. Despain said--he told Mr. Miller, he said--, I don't 
remember, but it wasn't a $50 bill, it was some tens and twenties 
that I lent the defendant. And the defendant's statement to 
both--or to Officer Bigelow was that it was a $50 bill that he 
gave Krista Warberg." (R. 170 at 278). 
But for the admission of Miller's testimony, the outcome of 
the proceedings may reasonably have been more favorable for 
Tueller. The prosecutor's entire line of questioning and his 
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summation to the jury in closing may have strayed the jury from 
returning a more favorable result. Without Miller's testimony, 
there would have been no evidence other than the testimony of 
Despain and Tueller as to the loaned money. Admission of 
Miller's testimony impeaching Despain on both the amount of money 
and the denomination of money loaned to Tueller may have fostered 
in the jury a belief that if Despain lied about the amount and 
denomination, he very well may have lied about loaning Tueller 
money at all. The jury then may have believed that Tueller stole 
the tickets outright from Krista Warberg instead of giving her 
the $50.00 Tueller maintains that she asked for them. Had the 
jury believed that Tueller gave Ms. Warberg $50.00 before he 
drove away, they could have reasonably returned from deliberation 
with a conviction of the lessor included offense of theft, rather 
than convicting him as charged of the second degree felony of 
theft from a person. 
The resulting prejudice to Tueller's defense by the 
admission of Miller's testimony was not obviated by the trial 
judge. The trial judge could have obviated this prejudice either 
by granting defense motions for exclusion of Miller's testimony 
or for a mistrial, or by ordering any of the remedial measures 
provided for by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g). 
One instance where a trial judge succeeded in obviating the 
prejudice caused to the defense by admission of evidence in 
violation of Rule 16(a) occurred in State v. Archuleta. In that 
case, the defense had requested and received copies of police 
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interviews with one of the State's witnesses. In a interview 
with prosecutors the evening before the witness testified at 
trial, the witness mentioned for the first time information 
implicating the defendant in the crime. The prosecutors admitted 
to failing to disclose the newly discovered information to the 
defense before they elicited it at trial. denying the defense's 
motion for mistrial, the trial judge issued a curative order and 
motion to strike the testimony. The Supreme Court of Utah held 
that the use of the new testimony at trial did not require 
reversal because "the curative order more than adequately advised 
the jury about the inadmissibility and questionable nature" of 
the testimony. 850 P.2d at 1244. Because the trial judge had 
obviated any prejudice to defendant with the curative order and 
motion to strike, the judge found that the State's discovery 
violation was not so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in 
the verdict and no substantial likelihood that the outcome would 
have been different absent its admission. 
The case at bar differs substantially from Archuleta. While 
Archuleta suffered no prejudice as a result of the State's 
discovery violation because the curative order and motion to 
strike mitigated that prejudice, here Tueller's defense was 
impaired by the State's nondisclosure and the trial judge failed 
to obviate this prejudice by his failure to order remedial 
measures as empowered to him under Utah R.Crim.P. 16(g). The 
trial judge here could easily have safeguarded justice by simply 
following the lead of the trial judge in Archuleta. A simple 
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curative order coupled with an order to strike would have 
obviated the prejudice caused to Tueller by Miller's testimony. 
The trial judge's failure to do so constitutes reversible error, 
especially in light of the questionable and unreliable nature of 
Miller's testimony. 
The trial judge could have also obviated the prejudice to 
Tueller by granting the defense's motions for a mistrial or in 
the alternative, its motion to exclude Miller's testimony. 
Either the mistrial or the exclusion of Miller's testimony would 
have obviated the prejudice suffered by Tueller. The mistrial, 
had it been granted, would have entirely precluded any prejudice 
to the defense since the trial would have ended before Miller 
could testify in the face of the State's discovery violation. 
Exclusion of Miller's testimony would have been a less drastic 
remedy and would have served the same purpose as a mistrial in 
precluding any prejudice to Tueller. 
Once the defendant has made a credible argument that the 
prosecution's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the 
State to persuade the Court that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have 
been more favorable for the defendant. Knight 734 P.2d at 921 
(Utah 1987). 
POINT II. 
THE STATE'S KNOWING ELICITATION OF FALSE TESTIMONY BY 
RON MILLER REQUIRES THAT MR. TUELLER BE GRANTED A NEW 
TRIAL. 
As set forth supra at argument I.A., the prosecutor 
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knowingly elicited false testimony from State Investigator Ron 
Miller at trial. Miller testified falsely that he did not record 
the October 17 interview with defense witness Matthew Despain, 
nor did he take notes (see argument I.A. supra). After eliciting 
the false testimony, the prosecutor did nothing to clear up this 
false information in the minds of the jury. The elicitation of 
false testimony caused prejudice to defendant/appellant which 
affected the judgment of the jury. 
Convictions obtained through the knowing use of false 
evidence fall under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 
L.Ed.2d. 1217 (1959), see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d. 104 (1972). Such convictions are 
fundamentally unfair and violative of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, § 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution. Mooney v. Holohan, 249 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 
L.Ed. 791 (1935), Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false 
evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a 
tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered 
liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the 
false testimony goes only to the credibility of a 
witness, (emphasis added, citations omitted) Napue, 360 
U.S. at 269, Giglio. 405 U.S. at 153. 
The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a 
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the 
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely 
that a defendant's life or liberty may depend. Napue, 
360 U.S. at 269. 
In the present case, the elicitation of Miller's testimony 
stating that he did not record the October 17 interview adversely 
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affected the credibility of the whole of the testimony of defense 
witness Matthew Despain. Miller's testimony called Despain's 
statement that the interview was recorded by Miller and Lunnen 
into question. Once Despain7s honesty was called into question 
regarding this statement, his entire testimony became subject to 
more serious scrutiny as to its trustworthiness by the jury. 
This would not have occurred but for the State's knowing 
elicitation of Miller's false testimony. In addition to 
undermining the truthfulness and reliability of Despain's 
testimony, by eliciting false testimony from Miller, the State 
enhanced Miller's credibility which in turn enhanced the 
prejudicial nature of this evidence. Despain's testimony was 
critical to assessing credibility to the defendant, and that 
testimony directly contradicts Miller's. This contradiction 
created an enormous false impression for the jury - that Despain 
had a propensity for untruthfulness. This taint was more than 
sufficient to distort the jury process. 
The jury could settle the matter only by making judgments on 
the credibility of Despain. They had false information 
concerning Despain's credibility. The resulting jury verdict 
could not have been reliable; the trial could not have been a 
fair one. 
While the State has a duty to secure appropriate 
convictions, it has "an even higher duty to see justice done," 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691, quoting Codianna v. Morris, 
594 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1979). Here the prosecutor wrongfully 
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elicited the false information from Miller to secure Tueller's 
conviction. By his own admission, Lunnen was only going to call 
Miller to testify if the defense was going to call Despain (R. 
170 at 203). There was never any reasonable question whether the 
only defense witness to the alleged criminal wrongdoing would be 
called to testify, and the prosecutor knew Despain was to be a 
witness (R. 170 at 203). That Miller was going to testify at all 
and that he was going to testify falsely to the recording of the 
interview was information concealed from the defense until the 
day of trial. This created information created a false 
impression in the minds of the jurors that the interview was not 
recorded and that Despain lied when he said it was recorded. 
The use of false evidence involves a corruption of the truth 
seeking function of the trial process. Instead of being a quest 
for the truth, the prosecution's knowing elicitation of the false 
testimony reduced the role of the jury trial to a mere contest 
between the parties to win. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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AIT. 1, S D V U l l Q l i i U l l V / i l W f W i < U l 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
AX.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A-LJUd 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
&JJL 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. SUte v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C«LS. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
i 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.LR.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «» 82; 
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Croat-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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abuse. State v. Laroper, 779 P.2d 1125 (Utah five-year-old victim and Division of Family 
1989). Services worker was error because defendant 
Construction. was unable to explore contradictory or confus-
This rule is permissive, not exclusive. Noth-
 i n g portions of the victim's testimony, and prej. 
ing in the language of the rule can be fairly
 u d i c i a l because t h e tape was the most damning 
construed to support the contention that other
 e v i d e n c e n t e d a t trial. State v. Lenaourg, 
methods to accomodate child witnesses are pro- _Q1 « „ , . „ « , ,T7, , 1 Q Q m 6 
hibited. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. 7 b l *M A6Z ( U t a h i y b y ) ' 
App. 1991). Cited in State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 
Improper admission. (Utah 1989). 
Admission of videotape of interview between 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse Journal of Contemporary Law. — Corn-
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443. ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev. Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
XT . ,T . , . . ., m ^ * tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81 
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an nogo) 
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the
 A T " _, , . . . . . . . 
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the De- A'UR' ~ Closed-circuit television witness 
fendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L. examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155. 
Rev. 461. 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
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ix) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
<h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Discretion of court. 
Failure to request discovery. 
Noncompliance. 
Nondisclosure. 
—No violation of rule. 
—Remedies. 
—Waiver of error. 
Physical evidence. 
—Stolen property. 
Required disclosure. 
—State 
Voluntary prosecutorial response. 
Witnesses. 
Cited 
In general. 
Discovery powers are conferred upon both 
the circuit courts and the district courts. State 
v Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983). 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure, 
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discov-
ered inculpatory information which falls 
w
»thin the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707 
P^d 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 734 
P2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Discretion of court 
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in 
wanting or refusing discovery and inspection, 
and its determinations on this subject will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other 
grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (g) grants a trial court ample 
discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party 
resulting from a breach of the criminal discov-
ery rules. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1989). 
Failure to request discovery. 
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's 
failure to provide him with a police report de-
scribing a witness* testimony prior to trial was 
not entertained, no request for discovery, writ-
ten or oral, being made at any time. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
Noncompliance. 
The crux of a Subdivision (g) motion is a re-
quirement that the moving party show that the 
other party has failed to furnish discovery as 
required by the rule. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1989). 
Nondisclosure. 
—No violation of rule. 
State's failure to disclose to defendant before 
trial certain jail records which corroborated de-
fendant's testimony that he requested medical 
treatment while in jail did not violate defen-
dant's discovery rights where there was no 
showing in record from which it could be fairly 
inferred that prosecution knew or should have 
Rule 30 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 364 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10. 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
Harmless error. 
Minor defect. 
Substantial right affected. 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
Variances. 
Cited. 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Even though admission of photographs of 
manslaughter victim served only to create 
emotional impact on jury, their admission was 
not reversible error; they were not so gruesome 
or offensive that their absence would have re-
sulted in a more favorable outcome for defen-
dant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979). 
Clerical mistakes, 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held 
in his presence, where he was addressed by the 
judge and elected to speak, and an amended 
judgment subsequently entered by the trial 
court, at which the defendant was not present 
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a 
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence. 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988). 
Harmless error. 
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of female under age of 18 years, although it 
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts 
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for 
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to 
defendant so as to require reversal. State v. 
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911). 
Where defendant in murder prosecution con-
tested every step taken by state during 
progress of trial and was afforded every oppor-
tunity to defend charge, and his counsel in-
sisted upon every right to which the law enti-
tled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not 
guilty was received on legal holiday did not 
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52 
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918). 
In a prosecution of a state fish and game 
warden for appropriating state money to his 
own use, an instruction in which the court read 
the entire statute on misuse of public money 
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice 
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded. 
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968 
(1922). 
The admission of testimony at trial in viola-
tion of defendants constitutional confrontation 
Indictments and informations, harmless 
errors, U.R.Cr.P. 4. 
rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
where such testimony was merely cumulative. 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982). 
Trial court's instruction that flight from 
scene of crime of aggravated burglary 
amounted to implied admission of guilt was er-
roneous, but was not prejudicial, since there 
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a con-
viction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 
1983). 
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on 
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional 
right not to take the stand did not require re-
versal where the other evidence of guilt was 
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections 
prevented the prosecutor from making any real 
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's 
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and 
prosecutor further obviated any harm that 
might have resulted from the comments. State 
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985). 
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an 
insurer in the information as comprising an 
element of aggravated arson was harmless 
error, where a correct instruction on the sub-
ject was later given to the jury immediately 
before their deliberations, to which no objec-
tion was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was 
harmless error as there was no reasonable like-
lihood of a more favorable result without the 
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State 
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
Minor defect 
Conviction for fornication would not be re-
versed because information charged defendant 
with having committed offense with one 
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where 
identity of woman was sufficiently established. 
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89 
(1912). 
Substantial right affected. 
Court could not reverse judgment unless 
some substantial right of defendant had been 
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P. 
271 (1918). 
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on 
appeal merely because some error or irregular-
ity may have occurred, but will be overturned 
only if the error or irregularity is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence there would have been a different result. 
State v. Hutchinson. 655 P.2d 635 <Utah 1982): 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); 
StatP v Mitrholl 77Q DOJ m c .TT._L moA. 
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ADDENDUM B 
JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532*5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
DOUGLAS TUELLER, 
Defendant 
FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Case No. 921009088FS 
CAO UNKNOWN 
COMM. PALACIOS 
COMES NOW the defendant, DOUGLAS TUELLER, through his/her 
attorney, JAMES A. VALDEZ, and requests the following material be 
provided to him/her as discovery no later than three days prior to 
the calendar call presently set for September 15, 1992. To-wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning the 
above-entitled case; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the defendant and 
co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal 
record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by 
the prosecution; 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
6. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5) (b) , the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 
DATED this oi day of September, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J4$ES"A. VALDEZ () 
Atmorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Salt Lake 
County Attorneys Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this day of September, 1992 
ADDENDUM C 
JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J W S 4" USrPJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
DOUGLAS TUELLER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
I, MATTHEW DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law 
on my oath depose and say: 
Regarding the interview that took place on or about October 
17, 1992 between myself, Ron Miller, and Rob Lunnen. I was 
interviewed about a case concerning Douglas Tueller. The interview 
lasted about 20 minutes. I was asked in the beginning if they could 
record the interview, at which time they started a tape recorder. 
They also took extensive notes to which my wife was a witness. 
DATED this & day of June, 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this 
*? r* day of June, 
1993. 
• r »h! 
rV/iD LOYOLA J 
Salt GteCity. VSfe2i1cr 
4tah 
My Commission Expires: 
co: ; : 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1993. 
J ± J 0 
JAMES A- VALDEZ, (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
to 3 4 » i W * 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
DOUGLAS TUELLER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921901548FS 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
I, ANN DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law on 
my oath depose and say: 
Witnessed the interview that took place on or about October 
17, 1992 between my husband, Matthew Despain, Ron Miller, and Rob 
Lunnen. The interview was concerning Douglas Tueller. The 
interview lasted about 20 minutes. My husband was asked in the 
beginning if they could record the interview, at which time they 
started a tape recorder. They also took extensive notes. 
DATED this ff — day of June, 1993. 
N^N DESPAIN f 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this o — day of June, 
1 9 9 3 . I Jotw Public DAVID LOYOLA 
>So." 
L_—NCSAR* 
My Commission Expires: 
P M * "* * 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1993. 
co::c 
ADDENDUM D 
r n v c u r m c M i I U H N C T u c n c n M L 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
March 18 , 1993 
James A. Valdez, Esq. 
Legal Defenders Office 
424 East 500 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
Re: State v. Tueller 
Dear Mr, Valdezr 
Please find enclosed the latest witness list for the 
Tueller trial. 
Very truly yours, 
ROBERT C. LUtfNEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Enforcement Division 
236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX NO: 801-538-1121 
STATE V. TUELLER 
Witness List 
1. Krista Warberg 
347 E. 700 North 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
(W) 263-3000 (H) 292-5768 
2. Diane Moulton 
4596 Russell 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
(H) 278-1658 
3. Brad Freckleton 
Delta Center 
301 W. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(W) 325-2000 
4. Officer Kyle Jones 
SLC Police Department 
315 E. 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5. Officer Mike Hill 
SLC Police Department 
315 E. 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6. Officer Kent Bigelow 
SLC Police Department 
315 E. 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
535-7222 
POTENTIAL WITNESSES: 
7. Matt Despain 
6845 Greenfield Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
8. Steve Moulton 
2200 Arbor Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
9. Danielle Anderson 
1012 Bellmontane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(H) 575-8331 (Parent) 521-3441 (W) 325-7328 
10. Chad Stapley 
684 East 1550 South 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
(H) 451-0715 549-2722 543-9985 
11. Laura Russell 
3375 West 5585 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
